The justice of God and the problem of evil refers to the theological dilemma, or cognitive dissonance, that arises when trying to reconcile the idea of a perfectly good, just, and all-powerful God with the existence of significant evil and suffering in the world, essentially asking how a just God could allow such things to happen; it's a central question in many religions, particularly Christianity, where the concept of God's justice is a core belief.
In this chapter we will combine the following two questions as if they were one, for they are closely related. This will no doubt require a few chapters to adequately address.
3. The justice of God is a debate issue in discussing foreknowledge and predestination (or determinism). If all my choices and deeds are the result of God's will, then how can I be fairly or justly condemned for doing what I could not help doing (what he made me to do)? Is it just for God not to stop a crime that he knows in advance will be committed?
I dealt with this subject in a series titled "Free Will and Determinism" (which you can locate in the archives for August-September of 2023). Also, in my series on Predestination I dealt with it. Let me cite from the second in that series (See here).
The main question to be addressed is whether God's permission and sufferance of events is in any sense causative. Is it in any way part of God's eternal decrees and purposes? In other words, can anything come to pass apart from God permissively willing it? Is divine permission necessary for the occurrence of all events that he does not directly cause?
Many affirm that God's permissive will is not in any sense a cause of what is permitted, and that his permissive will is different from his will of purpose in this regard, as if God had no purpose in what he suffers and permits.
The most popular "defense" for "solving" the difficulties involved in accepting the above propositions is the "free will defense."
From the philosoplyofreligion.info web page, the writers say:
"In order to refute the argument from moral evil, then, the theist must show that it is not necessarily the case that if God were omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent then the world would not contain moral evil. Under what circumstances, though, for what reason, might such a God allow such evil?
Theists almost invariably meet this question with the free-will defence. Moral evil is caused by the free choices of moral agents, they argue. Free agency, though, is a good thing; a world containing free agents is far better than either a world containing only automata or a world containing no conscious beings at all. An omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent God would therefore create a world containing free agents, and in doing so would run the risk of allowing moral evil to enter into the world.
The first way in which the free-will defence works, then, is by distancing God from the moral evil in the world. Moral evil is not brought about by God, the free-will defence argues, but by free agents. God is therefore not the author of moral evil, and so is not responsible for it."
"This conclusion might be criticized, however, in the following way: Even if it is the free agents that perpetrate moral evils that are directly responsible for them, God does seem to bear at least some indirect responsibility for them. After all, God created the free agents, knowing full well the risk that he was running in doing so, and is therefore at least partly to blame for their abuses of their freedom. God it can be argued, is guilty of negligence in creating free agents, even if not of actually perpetrating any moral crimes himself."
"The second way in which the free-will defence works is in justifying the existence of moral evil by justifying God’s creation of free agents. The existence of moral evil, the free-will defence argues, is a consequence of the existence of a greater good: free will. Without free will there could be no moral goodness; a world without free agents would be morally void. The good that is the existence of free moral agents, it is suggested, therefore outweighs the bad that is the existence of moral evil, and God therefore did well in creating free agents even though he knew that some of them would commit moral evils."
"Others have thought that the free-will defence fails because God could have created free agents without risking bringing moral evil into the world. There is nothing logically inconsistent about a free agent that always chooses the good. There are, then, among all of the possible free agents that God might have created, some free agents that would always have chosen the good. Why, it is sometimes asked, did God not create those free agents, leaving the others uncreated?"
"A further criticism of the free-will defence imagines a human being using it to justify his failure to intervene to prevent a crime from being committed. If one of us were able to prevent a brutal murder, but instead allowed it to take place, then we could not justify our inaction using the free-will defence. If we were to say that although we could have prevented the murder, we thought it best to protect the free-will of the murderer by allowing him to carry out his plan, then we would be judged to have made a moral error. Why, if this argument would be unacceptable coming from a human being, should we think it any more acceptable coming from God?"
Let us take a look at a chain of causes. I am a sinner. But, why? Is this not the effect of some cause(s)? Scripturally speaking, the cause of my being a sinner is because I sin. Being a sinner is the effect of having sinned. But, what was the cause of my sinning? My choice or will to sin. But, what caused my will to choose sin? A depraved nature. But, why do I have a depraved nature? The sin of Adam, the first man, was the cause of my having a depraved nature. But, why did Adam sin? What was the cause of his choice to transgress? His mutability and freedom of choice. Why is Adam mutable and free to choose? Because God gave Adam those qualities? Why did God give Adam those qualities?
Thus, we have traced the cause of sin back to God, the first cause in the chain of causes. Therefore, it is false to say that God is, in no sense, the cause of moral evil. In law and etiology there is the "but for" standard used in determining cause. "But for" this, then this (effect) would not have occurred. Of course, this is used to prove that a thing was, in some way, a cause, without determining the nature or kind of cause. Is it a minor or major cause? Only a contributing cause of several causes or a singular cause? Is it a cause that merits culpability and moral and legal "responsibility"? Though it is undeniable that God is, as the Bible and the old Baptist confessions affirm, the "first cause" of all things, including moral evil, yet it does not teach that he is therefore to be "blamed" for it. Atheists contend that God, the first cause, if he existed, must be to "blame" for all of man's sins and failures. They believe that a First Cause that foreknows all things cannot help escaping "blame." Therefore, they reject the idea of God, or of a God who has foreknowledge of all things.
Many affirm that God's permissive will is not in any sense a cause of what is permitted, and that his permissive will is different from his will of purpose in this regard, as if God had no purpose in what he suffers and permits.
The most popular "defense" for "solving" the difficulties involved in accepting the above propositions is the "free will defense."
From the philosoplyofreligion.info web page, the writers say:
"In order to refute the argument from moral evil, then, the theist must show that it is not necessarily the case that if God were omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent then the world would not contain moral evil. Under what circumstances, though, for what reason, might such a God allow such evil?
Theists almost invariably meet this question with the free-will defence. Moral evil is caused by the free choices of moral agents, they argue. Free agency, though, is a good thing; a world containing free agents is far better than either a world containing only automata or a world containing no conscious beings at all. An omniscient, omnipotent and benevolent God would therefore create a world containing free agents, and in doing so would run the risk of allowing moral evil to enter into the world.
The first way in which the free-will defence works, then, is by distancing God from the moral evil in the world. Moral evil is not brought about by God, the free-will defence argues, but by free agents. God is therefore not the author of moral evil, and so is not responsible for it."
"This conclusion might be criticized, however, in the following way: Even if it is the free agents that perpetrate moral evils that are directly responsible for them, God does seem to bear at least some indirect responsibility for them. After all, God created the free agents, knowing full well the risk that he was running in doing so, and is therefore at least partly to blame for their abuses of their freedom. God it can be argued, is guilty of negligence in creating free agents, even if not of actually perpetrating any moral crimes himself."
"The second way in which the free-will defence works is in justifying the existence of moral evil by justifying God’s creation of free agents. The existence of moral evil, the free-will defence argues, is a consequence of the existence of a greater good: free will. Without free will there could be no moral goodness; a world without free agents would be morally void. The good that is the existence of free moral agents, it is suggested, therefore outweighs the bad that is the existence of moral evil, and God therefore did well in creating free agents even though he knew that some of them would commit moral evils."
"Others have thought that the free-will defence fails because God could have created free agents without risking bringing moral evil into the world. There is nothing logically inconsistent about a free agent that always chooses the good. There are, then, among all of the possible free agents that God might have created, some free agents that would always have chosen the good. Why, it is sometimes asked, did God not create those free agents, leaving the others uncreated?"
"A further criticism of the free-will defence imagines a human being using it to justify his failure to intervene to prevent a crime from being committed. If one of us were able to prevent a brutal murder, but instead allowed it to take place, then we could not justify our inaction using the free-will defence. If we were to say that although we could have prevented the murder, we thought it best to protect the free-will of the murderer by allowing him to carry out his plan, then we would be judged to have made a moral error. Why, if this argument would be unacceptable coming from a human being, should we think it any more acceptable coming from God?"
Let us take a look at a chain of causes. I am a sinner. But, why? Is this not the effect of some cause(s)? Scripturally speaking, the cause of my being a sinner is because I sin. Being a sinner is the effect of having sinned. But, what was the cause of my sinning? My choice or will to sin. But, what caused my will to choose sin? A depraved nature. But, why do I have a depraved nature? The sin of Adam, the first man, was the cause of my having a depraved nature. But, why did Adam sin? What was the cause of his choice to transgress? His mutability and freedom of choice. Why is Adam mutable and free to choose? Because God gave Adam those qualities? Why did God give Adam those qualities?
Thus, we have traced the cause of sin back to God, the first cause in the chain of causes. Therefore, it is false to say that God is, in no sense, the cause of moral evil. In law and etiology there is the "but for" standard used in determining cause. "But for" this, then this (effect) would not have occurred. Of course, this is used to prove that a thing was, in some way, a cause, without determining the nature or kind of cause. Is it a minor or major cause? Only a contributing cause of several causes or a singular cause? Is it a cause that merits culpability and moral and legal "responsibility"? Though it is undeniable that God is, as the Bible and the old Baptist confessions affirm, the "first cause" of all things, including moral evil, yet it does not teach that he is therefore to be "blamed" for it. Atheists contend that God, the first cause, if he existed, must be to "blame" for all of man's sins and failures. They believe that a First Cause that foreknows all things cannot help escaping "blame." Therefore, they reject the idea of God, or of a God who has foreknowledge of all things.
If we simply take what the bible says at face value, we cannot deny that God is the cause of all things, including the evil. Notice these verses:
"And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose." (Rom. 8: 28)
"For of him, and through him, and to him, are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen." (Rom. 11: 36)
"In whom also we have obtained an inheritance, being predestinated according to the purpose of him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." (Eph. 1: 11)
"But to us there is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." (I Cor. 8: 6)
"For as the woman is of the man, even so is the man also by the woman; but all things of God." (I Cor. 11: 12)
"And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation." (II Cor. 5: 18)
Those who deny, for whatever reason, that evil exists by the will of God, do so in spite of the fact that the above verses affirm otherwise. "All things" must include all the good as well as all the evil. For many this is a hard truth to swallow. Their ideas about God and his character will not allow them to say that God, in any sense, is a cause of evil. They think that to affirm such makes God into a devil, or an evil being. However, I think that this is an emotional argument and rationale and not based upon what the scriptures reveal. For some, it is simply a case where they can't handle the truth.
All must agree that God could have created a world where creatures had a degree of free will and yet not commit sin. Many of us believe that this is the case with those who have been saved and confirmed in holiness. When the bible tells us that a day is coming when there is no more death or any of the ills consequent upon sin, it implies that there is no sin, and yet still some degree of free will. We repeat what we said in a previous chapter: God is free and has free will and yet it is not possible for him to do evil or to do wrong.
All also agree that God created a world with evil in order to bring about some greater good. Just what is that good is where the disagreement comes in. Many say it is because God gave his rational creatures, either angels or man, free will to do either good or evil, and this free will is the good God designs. And why did he give this free will? It is argued that God did not want to force creatures to love and serve him, but wanted them to do so freely. Again, I have addressed this line of argument before in several writings. The facts of the case prove that this is not a cogent line of argument, for the fact is God does exert tremendous force or influence towards causing people to love him. In fact, he commands people to love him, and calls it sin for them not to love him, and threatens them with eternal condemnation if they don't love him.
God does himself take responsibility for evil existing. Besides the scriptures already mentioned, consider that God says:
“I form the light, and create darkness: I make peace, and create evil: I the LORD do all these things.” (Isa. 45: 7 kjv)
There are those who resist believing that God creates evil, thinking that God cannot be in any sense the cause of evil. So, in order to make the verse more palatable they insist that the word "evil" does not denote moral evil, but "calamity," or the evil of punishment. They do this in spite of the fact that the Hebrew word "ra" is often translated as wickedness. Its usage shows that it is a versatile term used throughout the Old Testament to describe anything that is morally, ethically, or physically negative. It can refer to actions, thoughts, intentions, or conditions that are contrary to God's nature and commandments. As an adjective, it describes something as evil or wicked, while as a noun, it can denote wickedness or evil itself.
So, since God claims responsibility for the existence of evil, why is it then so difficult for many to find it nigh impossible to take God at his word? Especially seeing that they agree that God created a world where it was not only possible but certain that some would sin? For those who believe that God has foreknowledge, they must accept the proposition that God created a world that he foreknew would become totally sinful and where all would be destroyed in eternal hell. Having foreseen this he could have chosen not to create at all or he could have chosen to create a race of beings who were programmed to love and do only what is right and good. But, he didn't. Why?
Again, all must agree that God chose to create a world where evil would ensue and this is in essence what God means when he says he creates evil. And, all agree that God intended to bring forth good out of this evil. Some say that good is "free will," and the eventuality of having children and servants who freely chose to become such, who freely chose to love God apart from any constraint or coercion. They say that only by having free will is a person kept from being mere automatons or puppets. But, I insist that there is a higher end in view and that the good that God intended to bring out of the evil he creates is not free will, at least not how it is generally defined. That God can and does bring good out of evil is seen in many cases in the holy scriptures. In the next chapter we will look at some of those examples. We will also discover what is that good end that God has designed to come forth from the existence of evil.
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